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JURISDICTION O F T H E COURT
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f o r Review
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1-86 (1988); 63-46b-16 (1988); and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES/RULES
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

35-1-67

(1971)

is

the

determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the
Addendum hereto as Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Jackson seeks review of the Industrial Commission's Order
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to
workers' compensation occasioned by an April 10, 1972 industrial
accident.
Course of Proceedings
Mr.

Jackson

filed

an

application

for

permanent,

total

disability compensation benefits sustained as the result of his
industrial injury (R. at 5, 11).

Respondents alleged that Mr.

Jackson failed to prove legal and medical causation and was thus
not entitled to permanent, total disability benefits.
22).

(R. at 20-

A Hearing was held on June 23, 1992. (R. at 32).

Disposition Below
On July 28, 1992 the Administrative Law Judge held that Mr.
Jackson had failed to demonstrate sufficient "... evidence of both
legal and medical causation to rule that the industrial accident
was

a

significant

cause

of Applicant's

permanent

and

total

disability.11 (R. at 43). His claim for permanent, total disability
benefits was dismissed, with prejudice, by

2

an Order of the

Administrative Law Judge for failure to establish legal and medical
causation.

(R. at 39-44, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B).

On August 28, 1992, Mr. Jackson filed a Motion for Review with
the Industrial Commission (R. at 45-47) which ultimately denied his
Motion for Review on November 3, 1992 finding a lack of medical
causation. (R. at 88-93, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C).
He challenges that final agency action in this Petition for Review.
Statement of the Facts
In 1972 Mr. Jackson was employed by Kaiser Steel Corporation
as a loader/operator in an underground coal mine in central Utah.
At that time he was 54 years of age, had a 10th grade education,
and had worked for 34 years in underground coal mine employment.
His only other employment was a three-year stint in the military
service.

(R. at 40) .

He was also married with three dependent

children. (R. at 40).
On or about April 10, 1972, Mr. Jackson was engaged in
removing an hydraulic roof support in the mine when he stepped on
a piece of coal causing him to twist his hip injuring his lower
back.

The accident was promptly reported to his supervisor.

He

managed to finish his shift that day and saw Dr. Smoot at the East
Carbon Medical Clinic shortly thereafter. (R. at 40) .
Dr. Smoot diagnosed Mr. Jackson as suffering from degenerative
arthritis of the spine and took him off work.

(R. at 190) .

He

received temporary, total disability benefits from his employer, as
well as an award for 10% whole body permanent, partial impairment,
all related to his industrial accident. (R. at 9) .
3

His rating

increased to 12% as evidenced by a 1992 consultative examination.
(R. at 186).
Mr. Jackson attempted to return to work several times during
the following year, but was unable to work more than three or four
weeks at a time which precipitated his work termination by his
employer.

He estimated that he only worked about 4-1/2 months

after his accident.

(R. at 40) . Mr. Jackson also stated that pain

in his back and legs made working in "low coal" difficult.

(R. at

40) .
The Administrative Law Judge found that he had not worked for
19 years.

(R. at 41) .

Mr. Jackson further testified that Dr.

Smoot had "totaled him out" and rendered him permanently unable to
work.

(R. at 40).

He also testified that when he tried to return

to work, his supervisor at Kaiser Steel told him that he could not
return to work with a light duty release.

(R. at 40) .

This

testimony was uncontroverted, no witnesses appearing on behalf of
any

other

party.

Medical

records

either

corroborating

or

challenging that testimony could not be found.
Mr. Jackson never returned to work, and applied the month
after his work termination from Kaiser Steel for Social Security
total

disability

benefits. He was awarded

those benefits in

substantial part due to his industrial injury. His Social Security
disability award determined that he had been unable to work as of
April 24, 1973, the date he last worked following his sporadic work
history after his 1972 industrial injury.

4

(R. at 216-220).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
Mr. Jackson's present permanent total disability is causally
related in significant part to his 1972 industrial injury.

The

evidence that he sustained an industrial injury on that date was
overwhelming and
clearly

had

largely unrefuted.

other

physical

Although the Petitioner

problems,

including

a

pulmonary

condition, they were only a contributing factor to his disability,
the main reason for his being unable to work was his injured back.
This

Court

should

summarily

reverse

the

Industrial

Commission's final agency action by ruling that Mr. Jackson was
entitled to the presumption afforded by the "odd lot" doctrine, and
it was not rebutted as a matter of law in this case.

ARGUMENT
I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE REMEDIAL
PRINCIPLE THAT THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE
APPLIED LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL
DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE
INJURED WORKER.
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well
established in this State as that workers' compensation disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor
of the claim.

Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this

principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund.
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990).

State Tax Commission v. Industrial

Commission, supra. J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission.
5

661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983). Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d
1362 (Utah 1980).
(Utah 1965).
1964).

Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 613

Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah

M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah

1948). Chandler v. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra. discussed the
proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
x
employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other. should receive a very liberal

6

construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022, (Emphasis added)
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and the Industrial Commission in affirming
her Order, failed to apply this vital rule of construction.
Nowhere in the Findings, Conclusions or Order is there any evidence
of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in favor of
the claim".

Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the

record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the
injured

employee,

highlighting

differences in the record.

insignificant

and

immaterial

In addition, the Administrative Law

Judge and the Industrial Commission both selectively stressed Mr.
Jackson's

pulmonary

condition

and

virtually

ignored

his

industrially injured back.
For example, the Administrative Law Judge referenced Dr.
Lawson's medical records for their failure to "... mention a causal
link with the accident." (R. at 41).

The Industrial Commission

similarly argued by stating that "Dr. Lawson considered Jackson's
pulmonary condition and back and leg pain to be his principal
disabling

conditions

in 1974, but did not mention

connection with the industrial accident."

a causal

(R. at 90). However,

Kaiser Steel in fact paid temporary, total and a substantial
permanent, partial rating due to the back impairment related to his
1972 industrial accident, and hence, Dr. Lawson's alleged failure
to reference the industrial accident is really of no significance.
7

Nevertheless, this myopic approach by the Industrial Commission to
Dr. Lawson's Report is illustrative of its improper view of this
claim.
Second,

the

Social

Security

Administration's

award

of

entitlement for total disability was premised upon both his back
condition

(related to the industrial accident) as well as his

pulmonary condition.

Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge

referenced his Social Security award as one having been issued "...
on the basis of pulmonary condition ....'•

(R. at 41). Not only

did the Administrative Law Judge construe the Social Security award
against Mr. Jackson, but she also incorrectly referenced only a
part of the basis for the award.
Third, the 19-year period between the date of his industrial
accident and his filing of an application for benefits was cited as
a reason for questioning Mr. Jackson's credibility.

There is

nothing contained in the Workers Compensation Act that requires a
timely filing of a claim for permanent, total disability.

It is

submitted that the greater the time period between the date of the
industrial accident and the filing of an Application for Hearing is
not relevant to the credibility issue.

Once again, a minor and

immaterial fact was erroneously construed against Mr. Jackson's
claim.
Fourth, the Administrative Law Judge placed improper reliance
upon Dr. Hess' opinion that Mr. Jackson's lung condition - 20 years
after his industrial accident - appeared to be his major problem.
Obviously, Mr. Jackson's condition in 1992 is not reflective of the
8

medical problems that prevented him from working 20 years ago.
That he was awarded Social Security total disability benefits based
upon a back which has only minimally increased in impairment over
the years, and a lung condition which appears to be significant
now, does not establish that the cause of Mr. Jackson's inability
to work in 1972 was his pulmonary condition - particularly where
his uncontroverted testimony is to the effect that his continuing
back problems prevented him from successfully returning to work.
This is further true where there is absolutely no evidence in this
record indicating that the reason he was prevented from continuing
working was anything other than his back condition 20 years ago.
The simple fact of the matter is Mr. Jackson worked with his lung
condition - whatever it was - for almost 34 years in underground
coal mine employment, and it was not until he experienced a severe
industrial injury to his lower back in 1972 at age 54 that he was
unable to continue working or return to work after obtaining
medical treatment for his back.
Fifth, the Industrial Commission indicated there was little
"evidence" to support a finding of medical causation citing the
lack of medical records immediately

following the industrial

accident over 20 years ago; and the fact that Mr. Jackson had not
sought on-going treatment

for his back.

(R. at 109).

The

Industrial Commission totally ignores the uncontroverted testimony
by Mr. Jackson to the effect that it was his industrial injury to
his back that terminated his work, which such testimony certainly
constitutes "evidence."

In addition, the inability of an injured
9

worker to locate and obtain medical records over 20 years old
should certainly not be construed against an otherwise perfectly
valid

claim,

but

significantly,

this

is precisely

Industrial Commission is asking this Court to do.

what

the

Similarly, the

fact that he has not required on-going medical care does not in any
way diminish a finding of medical causation, and the Industrial
Commission's

attempt by innuendo clearly misses the mark but

demonstrates the improper approach it inaugurated in this case.
And sixth, the Industrial Commission's suggestion that Dr.
Hess' Report resulted in his concluding that Mr. Jackson's "...
back condition has improved over the years since his injury ..." is
a clear misreading of Dr. Hess' Report.

(R. at 110).

Mr. Jackson

was awarded a 10% whole body permanent, partial impairment by the
Employer, and Dr. Hess found that that impairment had increased to
12%.

(R. at 186).

He nevertheless attributed half of that

impairment to the industrial accident and half to pre-existing
conditions. Significantly, however, the Industrial Commission mischaracterized

the

impairment,

but

that

mis-characterization

nevertheless indicates, once again, its improper approach to this
industrial claim.
The attempt to assign Mr. Jackson's pulmonary condition as the
causation for his total disability is nothing more than a ruse to
get out of paying benefits and is simply not supported by the
record.

The entire underlying basis of the Order is fundamentally

flawed.

The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence "humane

lfl

and beneficent purposes" as required by law and the final agency
action fails due to this conceptual flaw.

II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO FIND THAT PETITIONER
EXPERIENCED A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT,
As noted above, the law is clear and overwhelming in this
jurisdiction that the Workman's Compensation Act is to be applied
liberally and in favor of awarding benefits, with all doubts being
resolved in favor of the injured worker.
Fund, supra.

Heaton v. Second Injury

This principle of construction is not only to be

applied to the application of law, but also to the reasonable
inferences which can be drawn from the facts.

Therefore, Mr.

Jackson is entitled to have all doubts as to whether he sustained
a compensable industrial injury as a result of the events of April
10, 1972 resolved in his favor.
In order to establish that he has suffered a compensable
injury under the Workers' Compensation Act, Mr. Jackson need show
that the injury occurred by accident, and that there is a causal
connection between the injury and his employment activities. Sisco
Hilte v. Industrial Commission, 766 P.2d 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In the landmark case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986), the Supreme Court defined what constitutes an accident
pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, stating as follows:
For purpose of worker's compensation, the key requirement
of an 'accident' is that the occurrence be unanticipated,
unplanned and unintended; where either cause of injury or
result of exertion is different from what would normally
be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned,
11

unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 'accident'. Id.
at 21.
Mr. Jackson testified that he suffered an industrial accident
when he was removing a hydraulic roof support and stepped on some
coal injuring his hip which eventually caused severe impairing
damage to his back.
never

rebutted

by

(R. at 40) .
contrary

His version of the events was

testimony

since

no

controverting

witnesses were called to testify. Further, no medical evidence was
offered by Respondents which would suggest that Mr. Jackson's
injuries were not at least partially the result of his 1972
industrial accident.

In fact, they paid temporary and permanent

workers compensation benefits, including medical expenses, for the
injury to his back.
The evidence that Mr. Jackson suffered an industrial injury on
that date was overwhelming and largely unrefuted.
the

Employer

disability

paid

temporary,

compensation

as

total

well

as

and

Significantly,

permanent,

medical

bills

partial
for

that

industrial injury. As such, no serious suggestion was made by the
Employer to dismiss the case because Mr. Jackson did not experience
an industrial accident.

Although the Administrative Law Judge

found a lack of both legal and medical causation, the Industrial
Commission

focused

on

the

casual

relationship

between

the

industrial accident and Mr. Jackson's total disability status. In
fact, the Industrial Commission conceded in preparatory language
that

M

... it appears that the Applicant suffered an industrial

accident and has suffered some permanent impairment therefrom ...."
(R. at 109).
12

Therefore, it would appear that the Industrial Commission has
essentially admitted that legal causation has been established in
this case, and any suggestion to the contrary is misplaced.

Ill
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE "ODD LOT"
DOCTRINE TO PETITIONER'S PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY
CLAIM. AND SUCH APPLICATION RESULTS IN A PRESUMPTION OF
ENTITLEMENT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REBUTTED.
Pursuant to well-established case-law, an injured worker may
be found to be totally disabled if by reason of the disability
resulting from the injury, the worker cannot perform work of the
general character that he/she was performing when injured, or any
other work which a person of his/her capabilities may be able to do
or learn to do.
(Utah 1984).

Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208

Brundaae v. IML Freight. Inc.. 622, P.2d 790 (1980).

Clark v. Interstate Homes. Inc., 604 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1979).
United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott. 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah
1964).

Caillet v. Industrial Commission. 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936).

The Industrial Commission cannot arbitrarily discount competent,
uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial injury was
the cause of Mr. Jackson's permanent, total disability

Kaiser

Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission.. 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985).
Frito-Lav. Inc. v. Jacobs. 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984).
There is essentially no serious dispute that Mr. Jackson
sustained an industrial injury. The only real issue is whether the
industrial injury was the cause of his permanent, total disability
status.
13

Although the Administrative Law Judge bemoans the lack of
recent medical treatment of the Petitioner, she did not order a
Medical Panel.

The most recent report was that of Dr. Wallace E.

Hess dated May 30, 1992.

Dr. Hess found that Mr. Jackson's

permanent, partial disability rating for his back had actually
increased from 10% to 12% on a whole body basis, with 6% impairment
due

to

the

industrial

injury

and

6%

due

to

pre-existing

degenerative changes. (R. at 180-187).
Mr.

Jackson

testified

that

it was

the

effects

of

his

industrial injury to his back which both terminated his work at
Kaiser Steel, and prevented him from returning to work.

He has

never suggested that his pulmonary condition served as an element
to his inability to return to work. None of the Respondents have,
in addition, suggested that his industrial back problem did not at
least in part serve as a reason for the impairment.

Hence, Mr.

Jackson's 1972 industrial accident may be properly viewed, and
should have been so viewed by the Industrial Commission, as "the
straw that broke the camel's back."
Mr. Jackson did not meaningfully return to work at Kaiser
Steel, although he attempted on several different occasions to do
so.

He recalls that he was only able to return for approximately

4-1/2 months, which is certainly not a successful return-to-work
effort.

Because he did not, and the uncontroverted evidence is to

the effect that he could not, return to work, he is entitled to the
"odd lot" presumption of permanent and total disability.
Marshall, supra.
14

See

Rebuttal may be satisfied if the Employer can demonstrate that
Mr. Jackson was able to secure employment of a special nature not
generally available, or that he was able to perform the duties of
his employment.

No such evidence whatsoever was offered by the

Respondents in this case.

In addition, Respondents failed to

indicate that Mr. Jackson was a viable candidate for vocational
rehabilitation

or retraining.

Therefore, the presumption of

entitlement was not rebutted in this case as a matter of law, and
Mr. Jackson is consequently entitled to Section 67 benefits.
A review of the medical evidence concerning Petitionees
industrial problems is further illuminating.
Dr. Seth E. Smoot's reports clearly indicate that the reason
Mr. Jackson was off work was due to his back injury and not due to
any pulmonary condition. (R. at 190) .
Dr. Paul R. Milligan in his orthopedic surgery notes of
February 13, 1973 confirms that Mr. Jackson injured himself as a
result of his stepping on a chunk of coal, (R. at 221) , a fact for
which the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly claimed there was no
support in the record.

(See R. at 40) .

Dr Mulligan states as

follows:
I doubt that it will be physically feasible for this man
to continue working in the mines for much longer. It is
my opinion that he is not a candidate for surgical
intervention. I do feel that he should be restricted in
stooping and heavy lifting.
I would estimate this
patient's permanent impairment of physical function on
the basis of his lumbar spine as 20% of his total body
function. (R. at 222). (Emphasis added)
Although Dr. Mulligan noted Mr. Jackson's "miners7 lung", he found
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that he could not work due to his back problems which were caused
by his industrial injury.

(R. at 222).

Dr. Robert H. Lamb's Discharge Summary dated April 8, 1974 notes
as follows:
This is a 55 year old male admitted with low back pain.
The patient had sustained a lifting injury when he
slipped working in a mine, twisting his back on the 10th
of April 1972. Since that time the patient had rather
persistent low back pain with some occasional sciatica on
both sides, greater on the left.
He also had some
bilateral paresthesia. (R at 198). (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Lamb further noted Petitioner's complaints of shortness of
breath; however his final diagnosis was degenerative lumbar spine
without any emphasis much less reference to the Petitioner's
pulmonary condition as being a contributing - major or minor factor to either his medical condition or his employability. (R at
198) .
Dr. Stephen A. Lawson in August 15, 1980 also noted both low
back problems as well as shortness of breath, but failed to find
that Petitioner's primary problem or at least the problem which was
preventing him from working, was pulmonary in nature. He reflected
that at that particular point in time - eight years after the
industrial injury - Mr. Jackson was disabled due to both his
orthopedic as well as his pulmonary condition.

(R. at 202) .

However,

1980

Mr.

Jackson's

pulmonary

condition

in

is

not

necessarily reflective of what it was eight years earlier at the
time of his industrial injury, and the records simply do not
reflect the presence of any meaningful breathing problem before the
industrial accident occurred.
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Finally, Mr. Jackson7s

Social

Security

total

Disability

application and file shows that his breathing problems were only a
contributing cause and that the main or precipitating reason that
he was unable to work was his 1972 industrial injury to his back.
(R at 216-233).
Therefore, Mr. Jackson has established his entitlement to
permanent, total disability as an "odd lot" injured worker.

His

presumption inherent in that doctrine has not been rebutted as a
matter of law and an appropriate award of benefits should be
issued.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its November 3, 1992
Order

dismissing

disability

Mr.

benefits

Jackson's
for

lack

claim
of

for

permanent,

total

medical

causation.

The

uncontroverted evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission
supports the finding that he sustained a significant impairment due
to his 1972 industrial accident, and is now permanently and totally
disabled due to his industrial injury. To the extent there is any
doubt or confusion as to medical causation, it was error for the
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the claim.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award
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him

permanent,

total

disability

benefits

based

on

uncontroverted facts and medical evidence jor-esremfced.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1993
DABN^Y & DABNEY, /&.q.

VIRG^p«JS-TDABNEY /\USQ.

Attorney for Petitioner

IS.

the

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 22nd day
of March, 1993 to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
(1 original & 7 copies)
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 South 300 East
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies)

Erie V, Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies)

Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
201 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-208

(2 copies)

Mr. Earl C. Jackson
Post Office Box 645
East Carbon, Utah 84520

(1 copy)

File
DABNEY & DABNEY,\p.
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A;

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1971).

EXHIBIT B:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(July 28, 1992).

EXHIBIT C;

Order Denying Motion for Review (November 3, 1992).

aa

35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits—Vocational rehabilitation
—Maximum benefit.
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the
average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $54
per week and not less than $29 per week, plus $5 for a dependent wife
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children; provided, however, that
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance
carrier be required to pay more than $24,648; and provided further, that
a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68,
not to exceed $890 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that
there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of
his average weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54 per week, out of that
special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, for such period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided)
to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and now receiving compensation benefits from the special fund
provided for by section 35-1-68 shall be paid compensation benefits at
the rate of $44 per week. This section shall apply to all persons permanently and totally disabled who are now receiving or hereafter become
entitled to receive compensation benefits from the special fund.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases,
however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in
excess of $24,648.
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FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on June
23, 1992, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law.

by

The defendants, Kaiser Steel and Uninsured
Employers' Fund, were represented by Edwin Barnes
Attorney at Law.
The defendant Employers'
Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie Boorman,
Administrator and Attorney at Law.
This is a claim for permanent and total disability filed in
connection with a back injury on April 10, 1972. Applicant claims
that injury rendered him unable to work, and he has not worked
since 1973. Defendants admit the occurrence of the 1972 industrial
injury but deny that applicant is permanently and totally disabled,
and also deny that the 197 2 injury caused any permanent and total
disability.
Temporary total disability compensation, medical
benefits, and a 10% permanent partial impairment rating were paid
to applicant by Kaiser Steel in connection with the 1972 injury.
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
Earl Jackson is presently a 74-year-old man who has not worked
in nineteen years. He worked as a coal miner his entire working
life, except for a three-year military stint during World War II.
In 1972, Jackson was employed by Kaiser Steel in the No. 3 mine in
central Utah as a loader/operator.
He was married with three
dependent children at the time of injury, and was entitled to the
maximum compensation rate then in effect, based on his wage rate.
On April 10, 1972, Jackson was removing a "duke" (a hydraulic
roof support) in the mine and stepped on a piece of coal. When he
stepped on the coal he twisted his hip. Jackson testified at the
hearing that he fell and landed on his right side. The medical
records prepared contemporaneous with the injury do not mention a
fall. The physician's report of injury describes the incident as
"twisting his hip," as does the employer's first report of injury
(Ex. A-l, p. 1,2.)
Jackson completed his shift and sought medical treatment
within several days. He testified that he went to Dr. Smoot at
East Carbon Clinic the next day. The physician's first report of
injury states he was first examined on April 14, four days later.
When asked about this contradiction at the hearing, Jackson
insisted he went to the doctor the next day and stated that the
injury actually occurred on April 12, not April 10 as the records
indicate.
Dr. Smoot's first report of injury states that Jackson
suffered from degenerative arthritis of the spine (Ex. A-l, p. 2.)
Jackson was off work for a period of time following the injury and
paid temporary total benefits by his employer. He testified that
he saw Dr. Smoot regularly during the next year, but no medical
records were provided.
Jackson testified that he attempted to return to work at
Kaiser's mine several times during the period 1972-1973 but was
unable to work more than three or four weeks at a time.
He
estimated he worked an overall total of 4 1/2 months during that
year. He stated that pain in his back and legs made working in
"low coal" (coal seams from 52" to 58" high) difficult.
In April, 1973, Jackson was told by his Kaiser supervisor that
he could not return to work with a light duty release from Dr.
Smoot, because light duty was unavailable at the mine. Jackson
testified that he was under the impression that Dr. Smoot "totaled
him out" at that time, and rendered him permanently unable to work.
There are no supporting records of Dr. Smoot in the record.

EARL JACKSON
ORDER
PAGE THREE

Jackson then applied for Social Security disability benefits,
a miner's pension, and black lung benefits. He was awarded all
three. He did not seek work again.
Jackson testified that he had not experienced any problems
with his back or breathing prior to 1972. The medical records of
Dr. Wright report a "fractured back 1950" but Jackson denied that.
(Ex. A-l, p. 25.) The medical records of Dr. Lawson indicate
Jackson suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in
1974, as well as degenerative disc disease, an ulcer and possible
coronary heart disease. Dr. Lawson considered Jackson's pulmonary
condition and back and leg pain to be his "principle disabling
conditions" in 1974, but does not mention a causal link with the
accident (Ex. A-l, pgs. 17, 8, 16.)
The Social Security records indicate that Jackson was awarded
disability based on a pulmonary and back condition that was
disabling in 1973, (Ex. A-l, p. 34.) but in his testimony, Jackson
repeatedly denied breathing problems in 1973.
In 1989 Jackson injured his shoulder in a car accident when
his vehicle was hit from behind. He told Dr. Hess that Dr. Heiner
performed surgery on the shoulder but no medical records were
available. Similarly, Jackson testified to neck surgery in 1988
but no medical records were available. Jackson testified that he
smoked a pack of cigarettes per day from the time he was fifteen
years old until approximately two years ago.
There is no evidence of recent medical treatment obtained by
Jackson. He was examined by Dr. Wallace Hess on May 30, 1992 at
the request of applicant's counsel. Dr. Hess made an extensive
review of medical records — including some records not provided to
the Commission in the hearing record — and concluded that
Jackson's back condition had actually improved since he stopped
working 19 years ago. He rated him with 6% impairment due to the
industrial injury and 6% for pre-existing degenerative changes. He
also opined that Jackson had ratable impairments in the form of his
non-industrial conditions: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
and his shoulder and neck problems. (Ex. A-2.) Dr. Hess also noted
that Jackson had severe shortness of breath during the examination
and wrote, "It would appear to this examiner that of his two main
complaints, the shortness of breath was his prime problem."
During Jackson's testimony at the hearing, he denied
difficulty breathing, and stated he was able to breathe and walk up
to a mile "if I had to." He also disputed Dr. Hess7 observation
that Jackson had told the doctor that he was unable to walk 1/4 of
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a block. The Administrative Law Judge observed that Jackson did
appear to have difficulty breathing during his testimony, but was
able to testify without interruption for approximately one hour.
Jackson's attorney stated at the beginning of the hearing that
his client delayed filing a permanent, total disability claim for
nineteen years because he "just didn't get around to it."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant has not met his burden of proving that the 1972
industrial accident was the cause of his permanent and total
disability. The Administrative Law Judge has concluded that —
even if the evidence were viewed in the light most favorable to the
applicant and he were found to be permanently and totally disabled
— the true cause of his disability was not the 1972 back injury.
Instead, the role of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and
lung condition appears to be more substantial.
This conclusion is supported by the following evidence: that
Jackson began receiving black lung and other disability benefits in
the early 1970s on the basis of pulmonary condition, that he has
not received any ongoing medical treatment for his back, that Dr.
Lawson found that the pulmonary condition was disabling as early as
1974, that Dr. Hess opines that Jackson's back has not worsened but
improved, and finally, that Dr. Hess finds the lung condition to be
his major problem.
The question before the Commission is whether or not the
industrial injury occurring on April 10, 1972 was a significant
cause of Applicants permanent and total disability status. The
inquiry into causation of Applicant's disability is governed by
case law set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986) and its progeny. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the
industrial accident need not be the "proximate cause" of the
disability, but merely a "dominant" or "significant" cause. Large
v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988).
In the case herein, there are medical records of
incapacitating physical problems which are unrelated to Jackson's
industrial accident. His lung condition was the basis for several
types of disability benefits and in fact, appeared to the
Administrative Law Judge to continue to hamper him at the time of
hearing. Although Jackson denies breathing problems in the early
1970's, that testimony is not credible when viewed together with
the fact that Jackson applied for black lung disability and other
benefits in the early 1970's and ceased working at that time. The

EARL JACKSON
ORDER
PAGE FIVE
several inconsistencies in Jackson's testimony, together with the
unexplained 19-year delay in applying for workers' compensation
permanent and total disability benefits, also render his claim less
credible.
After reviewing the above findings of fact, the Administrative
Law Judge finds insufficient evidence of both legal and medical
causation to rule that the industrial accident was a significant
cause of Applicant's permanent and total disability.
This case is somewhat analogous to Hodges v. Western Piling
and Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), wherein an applicant
was denied permanent and total disability benefits on the grounds
of causation. In that case, medical evidence established that the
applicant would be "one hundred percent impaired as a result of
arthritis alone..." Id. at 721. The record in this case indicates
that Jackson may have been capacitated due to his breathing
problems alone, and that they had a very practical and measurable
impact on his ability to work.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of permanent and total
disability of Earl Jackson in connection with his April 10, 1972
industrial injury is denied for lack of causation, and the same is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge
Certified thisJ^j^Lday of
ATTEST:

.xc-j-z/r.

Ix^cx
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Earl C. Jackson,

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.

*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Kaiser Steel Corporation,
*
Uninsured Employers Fund, and/or*
Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
*

Case No. 91001049

*

Respondents•

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah issues this order pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 63-46b-12.
Applicant timely filed this motion for review of the order of
the administrative law judge (ALJ) in the above referenced matter
dated July 28, 1992. Said order denied the applicant's claim for
permanent total disability benefits for a back injury suffered
during an industrial accident on or about April 10, 1972.
I. DID THE ALJ ERR BY HER FAILURE TO
CONSTRUE THE WORKERS COMPENSATION STATUTE
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE APPLICANT?
The applicant claims that the ALJ erred in her failure to
construe the workers compensation act liberally in favor of
awarding benefits to the applicant. He asserts that a long history
of Utah workers compensation case law supports his view that any
doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the
claim. The respondent notes that the Utah courts have required
liberal construction of the workers compensation statute and
resolution of doubts in favor of the applicant in situations where
the evidence on both sides is equally probative. However, there is
no requirement that an applicant be awarded benefits when he has
failed to present evidence to show the requisite causal connection
between his disabling condition and his industrial accident.
The cases cited by the applicant in support of his motion for
review relate to the general principles behind the proper
construction of the workers compensation statute. The Utah Supreme
Court has noted that "the right to compensation arises out of the
relation existing between employer and employee, and that the
injury arises out of and in the course of employment." Chandler v.
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020, 1021 (Utah 1919). Nothing in
the analysis of the purposes of the workers compensation act
presented in Chandler supports the notion that an employee who
cannot establish a causal connection between his disability and his
employment is entitled to benefits.
The question at issue in this case is whether the applicant,
who is already receiving benefits for black lung and social
EXHIBIT C
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security disability, is entitled to permanent total disability
benefits for his industrial back injury.
The applicant has
produced no evidence regarding the extent of his disability from
his treating physician. The medical evaluation conducted at the
request of the commission back in 1973 gave the applicant a 10%
permanent partial impairment rating. In an evaluation conducted by
Dr. Hess based upon an extensive review of medical records, the
applicant was given a 6% impairment rating based upon the
industrial accident and 6% based upon pre-existing degenerative
changes. Even the most generous construction of the statute and
resolution of doubt in favor of the applicant would not support a
finding of permanent total disability as a result of the
applicant's 1972 industrial accident.
II. DID THE ALJ ERR IN FAILING TO ADDRESS
THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE APPLICANT'S INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND HIS
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY?
The applicant asserts that the ALJ failed to address the
causal relationship between the applicant's permanent total
disability and his industrial accident. Our review of the record
indicates that the ALJ adequately addressed the issues of medical
and legal causation.
Under the analyses set out in Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (1986) and Large v. Howard
Trucking, 758 P.2d 954 (1988), a claimant must show that he was
injured by accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment and that his disability is causally related to his
industrial accident. The applicant has not met this burden. While
it appears that the applicant suffered an industrial accident and
has suffered some permanent impairment therefrom, the medical
causal connection between the industrial accident and the
applicant's permanent total disability is tenuous at best.
The applicant must "prove the disability is medically the
result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related
activity." Allen at 27. "In the event the claimant cannot show a
medical causal connection, compensation should be denied. Id. The
applicant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his
disability was medically caused by his industrial injury. Large at
956. The evidence in the record is insufficient to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the applicant's disability is
causally related to his industrial accident.
Examination of the record indicates that there was little
evidence to support a finding of medical causation. The applicant
failed to produce the medical records of Dr. Smoot, his treating
physician, for the period immediately following the industrial
accident. The record further shows that the applicant has not
received any ongoing treatment for his back injury although he has
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been repeatedly evaluated by a number of physicians. Dr. Smoot's
First Report of Injury states that Jackson suffered from
degenerative arthritis of the spine (Exhibit A-l, p.2). Dr.
Milligan, in February 1973, diagnosed degenerative arthritis of the
lumbar spine.
(Exhibit D, Motion for Review). Dr. Lawson, in
1974, indicated that the applicant suffered from chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, as well as degenerative disc
disease, an ulcer, and possible coronary heart disease. Dr. Lawson
considered Jackson's pulmonary condition and back and leg pain to
be his principle disabling conditions in 1974, but did not mention
a causal connection with the industrial accident. (Exhibit A-l,
pp. 8, 16, 17). Dr. Lamb, in April 1974, diagnosed lumbar disc
disease, emphysema and chronic bronchitis. (Medical Exhibit E).
Dr. Stephen Lawson in April 1974, diagnosed chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, which was moderate to moderately severe, as well
as degenerative disease of the lumbar spine with old compression
fractures and probable nerve root irritation. (Medical Exhibit F) .
Pulmonary function tests conducted at Holy Cross Hospital by
Dr. Simons in August 1980 show that the applicant has moderate
obstructive airway disease (Medical Record Exhibit H) . In July
1980, Dr. Watts of Utah Valley Hospital, read the applicant's xrays to show slight scoliosis of the lumbar spine with associated
degenerative changes. (Medical Record Exhibit I) . A report by Dr.
Wright, in June 1980, mentions that the applicant fractured his
back in 1950 and has some tenderness over his lumbar spine with no
swelling, deformity or limitation of movement. He further noted
that the applicant had disabling pulmonary disease.
(Medical
Records Exhibit K). Dr. Goldstein in February 1981 diagnosed nerve
root irritation in the lower lumbar region and moderate
degenerative changes to the lumbar spine. (Medical Exhibit G ) .
Dr. Hess, in 1992, reviewed the applicant's medical records
and concluded that the applicant's back condition has improved over
the years since his injury and found that the applicant's lung
condition is currently his "major" problem.
He rated the
applicant's impairment at 6% from the industrial accident and 6%
from pre-existing degenerative changes. (Exhibit A-2).
The applicant testified that he was unable to return to work
after the accident solely because of the pain in his back and legs.
However, soon after the applicant received his lump sum workers
compensation award for permanent partial disability, he applied for
and received social security disability benefits for his pulmonary
and back conditions as well as black lung disability benefits.
Although the applicant repeatedly denied that he had breathing
problems in 1973, he was awarded black lung benefits which requires
a finding of "total disability" under federal law. A living miner
is considered "totally disabled" when "pneumoconiosis prevents
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him or her from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills
and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or
mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity
and over a substantial period of time." 30 USC section 902(f)(1);
Bohn v. Harris, 494 F.Supp. 101, 104 (D. Utah 1980).
In addition, despite the applicant's claim that he had no
difficulty breathing, the ALJ observed that he did appear to have
difficulty breathing during his testimony, although he was able to
testify without interruption for approximately one hour.
The
applicant's only explanation for his nineteen year delay in filing
a claim for permanent total disability was that he "just didn't get
around to it." Therefore, the evidence in the record supports the
ALJ's conclusion that the applicant's total disability during the
period subsequent to his industrial accident was the result of his
pulmonary problems rather than his industrial back injury.
III.

ARE THE ALJ'S CONCLUSIONS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

The applicant asserts that the ALJ's Order fails to delineate
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the
ALJ's Order in light of Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18 (1991) , indicates that the ALJ made findings sufficient to
"disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached."
Milne Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979) cited in Adams, at 20. The ALJ's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are sufficient to show what issues were decided,
the legal interpretations and applications made, as well as the
subsidiary factual findings which support her decision. See Adams
at 21.
The ALJ's findings of fact are similar to those recited by the
applicant in his motion for review.
However, the applicant's
version of the facts fails to discuss the inconsistencies and
contradictions between the applicant's testimony and the medical
evidence. Although the applicant denied having breathing problems
back in 1972-73, the medical evidence details that the applicant
was experiencing pulmonary difficulties. Although the applicant
denied having these problems at the hearing, it appeared to the ALJ
that he was, in fact experiencing some difficulties with his
breathing. The applicant is receiving benefits for disability from
the Social Security Administration for his pulmonary disease and
his back condition as well as black lung benefits for pulmonary
disease. A prerequisite for receiving black lung benefits is that
the claimant be unable to perform his usual work because of his
pulmonary disorder.
The applicant's complaint that the ALJ failed to convene a

Earl C. Jackson
Order
Page five
medical panel is likewise without merit because a panel evaluated
the applicant in 1973 and ruled that he was only 10% impaired. In
the 1992 medical examination, Dr. Hess determined that the
applicant was only 6% impaired due to his industrial injury. In
addition, there was no conflicting medical evidence in the record
to bring into question the issue of medical causation. Referral of
a matter to a medical panel on an industrial injury claim is within
the discretion of the commission pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-77 and
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9 (1992). We do not believe that
referral to a medical panel was warranted in this case.
We believe that there is substantial evidence in the record
to support the ALJ's conclusion that the applicant was and is
permanently and totally disabled as a result of his pulmonary
condition and not his industrial back injury.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge
dated July 28, 1992 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeaJ^ purposes,

Stephen M. H&dl
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